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The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Section on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) has been an important part of my 
academic career since I began teaching.1 In 1987, I received a call from section 
chair Jean Love (Iowa then, Santa Clara now) asking me to get involved in 
the section because it needed more women on its Executive Committee. I 
served as secretary in 1988 and 1989, as chair-elect in 1990, and as chair in 
1991. As described below, my work with the section provided me with valuable 
opportunities to get more deeply involved with legal education at the national 
level and the full range of AALS activities. I encourage all faculty members, 
especially new ones, to get involved with section activities and volunteer for 
leadership opportunities. My academic career would not have been as rich 
without this engagement with the AALS and the important issues facing legal 
education over my career.
This article discusses three aspects of the SOGI Section’s history. First, it 
reviews the section’s activities at the 1992 AALS Annual Meeting. Second, it 
discusses how the AALS implemented its Bylaw and Executive Committee 
Regulations that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
(and now gender identity after a recent revision). Finally, it encourages the 
AALS to discontinue use of some of the guidelines adopted in the early 1990s to 
guide its interactions with religiously affi  liated law schools when confl icts arise 
concerning allegations of sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination.
At the 1992 Annual Meeting, I moderated the section panel on “Using State 
Constitutional Law to Advance the Rights of Gay Men and Lesbians.” The 
panelists were Marc A. Fajer of the University of Miami School of Law; Sheila 
James Kuehl, then of the Southern California Women’s Law Center and 
currently serving on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors;2 Shirley 
1. I became a tenure-track assistant professor at California Western School of Law, San Diego, 
in July 1987. Before that, I served for four years in the legal writing program at the University 
of Wisconsin Law School with a joint appointment in the Women’s Studies Department for 
the last two years.
2. See Catherine Saillant, Abby Sewell & James Rainey, Kuehl’s Victory No Guarantee of Pro-Labor 
Bloc, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014, at A1; www.supervisorkuehl.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
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A. Wiegand, then at the University of Oklahoma; and J. Patrick Wiseman, 
Esq., of Richards, Wiseman & Durst.3 Our second panel was on “Women, 
AIDS, and Health Care,” and co-sponsored with the Medicine and Health 
Care Section. The panelists were Taunya Lovell Banks of the University of 
Maryland School of Law; Karen H. Rothenberg, at the time also from the 
University of Maryland; and Dr. Mary Young of the Georgetown University 
Division of Infectious Diseases; Anne B. Goldstein of Western New England 
University School of Law moderated.4 Both sessions were well-attended. Fifty 
people attended the section’s business meeting, and a social gathering with the 
San Antonio lesbian and gay bar association followed.5 Section offi  cers should 
consider the valuable opportunities that come from co-sponsoring programs 
with other sections. Not only does this provide additional opportunities for 
section members to present their scholarly work at the Annual Meeting, but 
it also promotes intersection engagement and interdisciplinary opportunities.
The section made an important move forward at the 1990 House of 
Representatives meeting at which the House amended Bylaw 6-4(a) (now 
6-3(a)) by adding “age, handicap or disability, or sexual orientation” to its 
nondiscrimination provision.6 Although new to the section, I remember being 
ecstatic that more than two-thirds of the member schools voted in favor of 
adding these protections to the Bylaw.7
The focus of my time as chair of the section and afterward has been most 
concerned with two issues: (1) how the AALS would implement Bylaw 6-4(a) 
(now 6-3(a)) across its member schools; and (2) how it would implement 
that Bylaw and Executive Committee Regulation (ECR) 6.17 (now 6-3.1), 
concerning law schools with a religious affi  liation or purpose.8 In December 
1991, toward the end of my service as chair, I was appointed to serve on the 
“AALS Executive Committee Regulation 6.17 Working Group” (Working 
Group), established by the AALS Executive Committee (EC), and I served 
in this capacity through November 1993.9 I later served as AALS interim 
3. See 1992 ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS. PROC.43.
4. Id. at 78, 85.
5. Id. at 418-19.
6. See 1990 ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS. PROC. 196–203.
7. Bylaw 8–3 states that a two-thirds vote is needed to amend any Bylaw. Bylaw 6–4(a) was 
amended by a voice vote. See 1990 ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS. PROC., supra note 6, at 202-03. Bylaw 
Section 8–3, Amendments: Voting, in ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS., ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 27 (1990).
8. See Executive Committee Regulations of the Association of American Law Schools 6–3.1, in ASS’N OF AM. 
L. SCHS., 2016 HANDBOOK 83 (2016) (hereinafter AALS 2016 HANDBOOK). ECR 6–3.1 states 
that religiously affi  liated law schools may use preferential admissions or employment 
practices for students, faculty, or staff  before their affi  liation with the law school as long as 
those “practices do not discriminate on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex, age, 
disability or sexual orientation. . . .”
9. The result of this work was the 1993 document Interpretative Principles to Guide Religiously Affi  liated 
Member Schools as They Implement Bylaw Section 6–4(a) and Executive Committee Regulation 6.17, in ASS’N 
OF AM. L. SCHS., 1994 HANDBOOK 81 (1994). See also Carl C. Monk, Remarks Delivered at the 
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deputy director for part of 1998-1999, and I served on the Membership Review 
Committee (MRC), which oversaw the AALS portion of the ABA/AALS 
accreditation process, from January 1999 to December 2001. I was originally 
appointed to the Working Group because I was serving as chair of the section 
when it was formed. Afterward, I became deeply involved in the membership 
review process of the AALS and was provided the opportunity to do scholarly 
and historical research into its eff orts to enforce Bylaw 6-4(a). But for my 
willingness to take that fi rst step and serve as a section offi  cer, these and other 
opportunities may not have arisen. While the AALS grappled with challenging 
issues of enforcement and membership, I had the chance to participate and 
help to add the section’s viewpoint to those issues it was considering.
This involvement with the AALS led to my article AALS as Creative Problem-
Solver: Implementing Bylaw 6–4(a) to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation in Legal Education.10 This article was an in-depth look at how the 
AALS implemented its revised Bylaw between 1990 and 2002. In the article, 
I tracked every member school from revision of the Bylaw in 1990 until that 
school adopted a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or until the end of 2002, whichever came fi rst.11 I also tracked 
the policy decisions made by the MRC and the EC related to Bylaw 6–4(a) 
and ECR 6.17 between 1989 and 2002.12 All this research was permitted by 
AALS ECR 5.7, which allows the executive director to provide access to the 
confi dential fi les of the AALS for research purposes.13
During this period, 107 of 162 member schools had or adopted compliant 
nondiscrimination policies that included sexual orientation without requiring 
any interaction with the AALS.14 But fi fty-fi ve schools required time and eff ort 
before agreeing to adopt such policies, and twenty-fi ve of those schools either 
required signifi cant time or appeared to actively resist AALS eff orts to require 
compliant policies through the MRC process.15 
The magnitude of the AALS member schools’ voting to adopt Bylaw 6-4(a) 
by a voice vote and implementing it despite signifi cant resistance from many 
member schools must be understood within the broader societal context. 
Only by situating these decisions within this broader context can this bold 
action by the AALS be appropriately recognized. 
Conference of Religiously Affi  liated Law Schools: Commentary on Destro, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 377, 382 (1995) 
(reprinting a copy of the Final Report of the AALS Executive Committee Regulation 6.17 
Working Group).
10. 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22 (2006).
11. Id. at 24–25.
12. Id. at 29–55.
13. Id. at 24. Executive Director Carl Monk approved this research project, and I had access to 
all the MRC and EC fi les during this period. 
14. Id. at 25–26. The AALS now has 178 member schools. See Members of the Association, ASS’N OF 
AM. L. SCHS., 2016 HANDBOOK 37 (2016).
15. Cox, supra note 10, at 25.
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In 1990, at the time the Bylaw was amended, only two states prohibited 
sexual orientation discrimination. During this same period, eff orts to create 
equal rights for same-sex couples were increasing across the U.S., as were 
the backlash against and resistance to these eff orts. By 1990, numerous cities 
and employers had adopted domestic partnership ordinances and policies 
providing some limited rights to registered same-sex couples.16 While these 
eff orts were not directly considered during the time the AALS was enforcing 
its nondiscrimination bylaw, the pressures from that larger social discussion 
led many states and schools to take a strong stance against legal rights for 
same-sex couples.
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court issued its Baehr v. Lewin opinion, holding 
that denying marriage licenses could be sex discrimination.17 In the aftermath 
of that opinion, between 1993 and 2003, more than forty states adopted statutes 
and constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying 
in those states and refusing to recognize marriages from other states. 18 It was 
during this same period that Congress and President Bill Clinton adopted 
the (so-called) Defense of Marriage Act.19 It is important to recognize this broader 
context when considering the work of the AALS in its eff ort to prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination in the legal academy. Much of the resistance that 
the AALS encountered may have been infl amed by the societal dissension 
outside the legal academy.
By the time my article was published and all AALS member schools 
had adopted (at least formally) compliant nondiscrimination policies, only 
thirteen additional states had prohibited such discrimination.20 Today, twenty 
states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity/expression, and two other states prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, although no federal law has been 
adopted.21 
16. Barbara J. Cox, From One Town’s “Alternative Families” Ordinance to Marriage Equality Nationwide, 52 
CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 68 (2015) (hereinafter Cox, From One Town). 
17. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), reh’g granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), 
remanded to Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), 
aff ’g order, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), and rev’d and remanded, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999), and rev’d 
and remanded, No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
18. Cox, From One Town, supra note 16, at 73.
19. Id. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codifi ed at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
(2012), overruled in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (whereby the 
defi nitional provision was held unconstitutional) and abrogated in part by Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (which undermined the constitutionality of the non-
recognition provision).
20. Cox, supra note 10, at 26 n.9.
21. See Nondiscrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCE PROJECT (NOV. 3, 2016), http://www.
lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/ECH3-CBN4]. 
Although no federal law exists, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
has issued “rulings . . . extending Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to prohibit 
discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity.” Id. 
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Despite this limited legal protection, the AALS implemented Bylaw 6–4(a) 
across a diverse membership consisting of schools from every region of the 
country, whether private, public, or religiously affi  liated. It did so without 
losing a single member school, despite threats of such defections throughout 
the process. It also did so without sanctioning any  school.22
This broader context also helps to explain why the AALS adopted 
“Interpretative Principles” that were based on a status/conduct distinction. 
At a time when the Supreme Court permitted states to criminalize same-sex 
sexual conduct,23 it is not surprising that the Working Group concluded that 
a status/conduct distinction was an appropriate compromise for guiding the 
AALS’s interactions with religiously affi  liated schools over its requirement 
that all member schools adopt nondiscrimination policies that included all 
protected classes, including sexual orientation. 
The Working Group ultimately consisted of three EC members, three 
SOGI Section members, and three representatives from religiously affi  liated 
schools.24 In an eff ort to achieve consensus, the Working Group created 
Interpretative Principle 4, which recognized that some states still criminalized 
same-sex sexual conduct under Bowers v. Hardwick.25 The Working Group 
ultimately compromised on the following language:
When [Bylaw 6–4(a) is] applied to religiously affi  liated schools, that absolute 
protection of the status of sexual orientation continues, but in the unique 
context of religious liberty, Bylaw 6–4(a) and ECR 6.17 should be interpreted 
to permit the regulation of conduct when that conduct is directly incompatible 
with the essential religious tenets and values of a member school.26
Discomfort with this status/conduct distinction, even under the Bowers 
regime, led the three SOGI representatives to insist on writing an “Additional 
Statement” that expressed our reservations. In that statement, we explained 
that “[f]orcing the sexual orientation/sexual conduct distinction places a 
premium on remaining undisclosed and undetected. We are troubled to the 
extent that a nondiscrimination Bylaw intended to reduce the cost of being 
‘out of the closet’ would do just the opposite.”27 In closing, we explained:
For the limited purpose of describing how religiously affi  liated schools may 
comply with the Association’s Bylaws and Executive Committee Regulations, 
22. Cox, supra note 10, at 26. 
23. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24. See Monk, supra note 9, at 387 (listing the Working Group members). The section’s 
representatives also included Art Leonard of New York Law School and Robert G. Wasson, 
Jr., of Suff olk University Law School.
25. See supra note 19. Bowers was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down 
sodomy laws as a violation of the due process clause).
26. Monk, supra note 9, at 385.
27. Id. at 388.
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we acknowledge that a distinction between sexual conduct and sexual 
orientation may be necessary to provide the maximum protection from 
discrimination presently attainable. We hope, however, that the time will come when 
religiously affi  liated institutions will revise their policies to provide appropriate respect for the 
privacy of their community members.28
Now that more than twenty years have passed since these principles were 
established, the AALS should reconsider its continuing use of these Working 
Group guidelines, as the “status/conduct” distinction that was questionable 
even in 1993 is no longer viable. As shown by the experiences of military service 
members during the “don’t ask, don’t tell” era, distinguishing between status 
and conduct simply creates an environment in which private conduct can be 
used to create a climate of fear and distrust.29 Additionally, because of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Romer v. Evans,30 Lawrence v. Texas,31 United States v. 
Windsor,32 and Obergefell v. Hodges,33 the continued adherence to the status/conduct 
distinction contained in Principle 4 has lost any possible legal underpinning. 
For example, marriage equality has now spread across the country, even in 
conservative states with numerous religiously affi  liated law schools. It would 
become increasingly problematic if the AALS were to permit schools to use 
the status/conduct distinction contained in Principle 4 to defend themselves 
against challenges that might arise from a law school’s refusal to recognize the 
legal marriages of its same-sex faculty, staff , and students.
Despite the amazing changes in legal regulation of sexual conduct and legal 
protection for LGBTQ individuals, couples, and families over the past twenty-
three years, the AALS has not revisited the Working Group Principles that 
were adopted in 1993. LGBTQ protections have changed drastically between 
1993, when Bowers was the law of the land and states could criminalize same-
sex sexual conduct, and 2016, when marriage for same-sex couples exists in 
every state, and “don’t ask, don’t tell” has been repealed. It is time for the 
AALS to reconsider Working Group Principle 4, which allows a religiously 
affi  liated law school to take adverse action against a person based on his or her 
private sexual conduct if that conduct confl icts with the sponsoring religion’s 
essential tenets.
28. Id.
29. See Barack Obama, Statement on the Repeal of the United States Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy, 
2 PUB. PAPERS 1092 (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2011-book2/pdf/
PPP-2011-book2-Doc-pg1092.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X6H-9RP9].
30. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down class-based legislation directed at LGBTQ people as a 
violation of the equal protection clause). 
31. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down sodomy laws as a violation of the due process clause). 
32. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down  Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as 
unconstitutional under the due process clause).
33. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding marriage equality for same-sex couples is constitutionally 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment). But cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (may provide an out to religiously-affi  liated law schools if they chose to 
pursue it).
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The AALS has, however, made signifi cant progress by revising Bylaws 
6-3(a) and (b) to include “gender identity and expression.” This change 
followed a discussion at the June 2014 AALS Midyear Workshop on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity.34 At that meeting, I joined Ellen Podgor of 
Stetson University College of Law, the 2014 SOGI Section chair, in leading a 
discussion of section members concerning the importance of asking the AALS 
to amend 6-3(a) and (b) to add “gender identity” where appropriate and to 
expand the push for affi  rmative action contained in Bylaw 6-3(c) to include 
“sexual orientation and gender identity.” AALS Executive Director Judith 
Areen and Associate Director Regina F. Burch attended the meeting. Professor 
Podgor and I also made a presentation to the EC on these issues on November 
7, 2014.
Director Areen issued Deans’ Memorandum 15-06 on June 15, 2015, 
indicating that the AALS Executive Committee had approved revisions 
of the Association’s Bylaws for consideration at the January 2016 Annual 
Meeting.35 Acknowledging the SOGI Section’s request for the amendment, 
the EC proposed amending Bylaws Sections 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) to include 
protection from discrimination on the basis of “gender (including identity and 
expression).”36 That change was adopted by two-thirds of the AALS member 
schools at the January 2016 meeting.37
The legal academy has changed signifi cantly in the twenty-fi ve years since I 
served as chair of the SOGI Section. Countless professors and staff  members 
are openly gay and have obtained protection for our sexual minority status 
and recognition of our relationships. Many of us who have been engaged 
over the intervening years admire the courage of the AALS in pursuing 
protections for members of the academy based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity. The time has come for the AALS to revise its Working Group 
Principles or curtail their ongoing use. Those Principles have lost their legal 
underpinning and confl ict with the Association’s Bylaws. All member schools 
of the AALS should be required to comply with the Association’s core value 
of nondiscrimination.38
34. See Barbara J. Cox, 2014 AALS Workshop on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues, AALS 
NEWS (Ass’n of Am. L. Schs.), Aug. 2014, at 8. 
35. See Memorandum 15–06 from Judith Areen, Dir., Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., to Deans of AALS 
Member Schools (June 15, 2015) (copy on fi le with author).
36. Id. at 4.
37. See Bylaws 6-3(a)-(b), in AALS 2016 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 57.
38. See Membership and Core Values, in AALS 2016 HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 3.
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